Recently I was using a map application on my phone, an application that lets gives turn by turn driving directions and works offline without a network connection. It works very well, but provided a lesson in defaults.
Typically I use the application as it comes “out of the box”, preferring highway travel as it is typically faster and simpler. Being in California Silicon Valley I decided after one agonizing drive on 87 and 101 during rush hour that maybe back roads would be better, so I changed a preference to disable highway travel. To my delight I discovered that back roads were much preferable, especially on short trips from San Jose to Mountain View, for example. Why bother sitting on 101 if you do not need to.
Everything was fine for a few days until I decided to leave California, and drive back to SFO (the San Francisco airport, for you non-frequent travelers who haven’t memorized a wide variety of airport codes). Guess what, I started driving and soon realized I was getting a local sightseeing tour of San Jose, and had a pretty good idea I was not aimed at the highway entrance leading to 101. I definitely wanted to use 101 for that drive (or so I thought; has traffic really gotten that bad in the Valley or did I just hit a bad day?) I pulled off the road, changed the preference, and then turned off the confused device since I had neither the time nor patience to wait while it sorted itself out. I made my own decisions on how to get to 87/101 and the problem was solved.
There are two lessons here. First, it is easy to forget about preferences (that is the idea and why they are “defaults” after all). Second, recovery might require some “out of band” effort, like giving up on the tool, making a manual (human, dare I suggest) correction.
My navigation experience was not a problem because I was somewhat familiar with the area, not really relying on the device after a few days and could just “punt”. If I had really needed I could have driven around a while until the device (hopefully) oriented itself.
I’m not sure what would happen in a case where a preference is related to privacy, but I suspect that I would not be able to recover as the personal data would already have been deposited in a giant “big data” store somewhere, ready to be sold, shared and used without my control or knowledge. Thus, if I choose to set a default to remember my decision to grant access (to location, address book, camera, microphone etc) forgetting this decision might be more serious. Although I do not use many such apps now, someday I might (1). If I forget the default, seeing an indicator in the chrome probably won’t help, as ads are training me to ignore every pane except the text in the pane I care about (2).
So let us say I mistakenly forget my privacy settings and realize it later. Is there a manual, human way to recover? Ideally I would go the the record on my device of which databases the apps shared information, follow the links and request the data to be removed, which it would be. That would be nice, but I suspect not so likely.
Thus perhaps a more significant change might be needed if user privacy matters. The best story I’ve heard is that the new currency is your information, and thus it should be marked appropriately, shared conservatively, and we should all participate in the monetization. Obviously this will require some work, but seems very interesting. Privacy will be a byproduct of the monetization, not the end in itself.
(1) Perhaps someone can explain to me why so many Lumia apps seem to require knowing my location to be installed. For example, why does a battery level app need to know my location? I can only assume it is not for me, the end-user, but for ad delivery.
(2) On Safari in Reader mode the browser removes the non-interesting material, a feature that is very useful, and on Firefox I can suppress ads with an extension, but many times I find myself in a raw, ad-splattered browser window when I forget to take special action.
Reactively responding to security threats is like a never-ending session of “whack-a-mole”. It will keep everyone busy but probably never end and does not scale with the complexity of the web, its applications and context. Responding to threats is important but we need a longer term solution to the underlying problem.
Ultimately what is needed is accountability as noted by Professor Hal Abelson of MIT (slides, PDF). What is also needed are systematic approaches to the underlying issues. For the most part this currently consists of best practices for code development (e.g. validate inputs), for operating system design (e.g. sandbox applications) and deployments (e.g. enforce password strength rules). One issue with this is that everyone is busy meeting time to market constraints and focused on “getting the job done” which typically is the visible functionality, not security. It takes a lot of discipline to build in security, and even so time with the degradation of algorithms and attacks based on complexity remain, creating a long term cost issue. Security and Privacy by Design are worthy approaches toward incorporating concern for these issues into the entire process, but are easier said than done.
Creating standards to enable interoperability is a lot of work, even when the standards are based on previous development experience. Just as code is modularized, so are standards, enabling writing, reviewing and interop testing in a reasonable time frame. This also allows the work to scale as different people work on different standards. This also creates issues as not all assumptions are documented or shared, or as new ideas and approaches appear later in the process (an example might be Promises for example). Some work is also abandoned for a variety of reasons, and this can be good as the community learns. The net result is that there can be inconsistencies among specifications in basic approaches (e.g. to the API interface designs). All of these groups are tasked with creating specific deliverables that specify functionality to be composed with the implementation of other specifications to create applications. This puts the application developer in charge of security and privacy, for only they understand the application, its context and end-end requirements. The designer of a component cannot speak to the privacy data re-use or retention possibilities, or key distribution approaches, for example.
This does not mean that security or privacy cannot be improved by the standardization community. They can. Notable examples include Strict Transport Security to ensure all requests for all web page resources use TLS regardless of web page links, and Cross Origin Sharing (CORS) to define a uniform approach for web browsers to enforce cross-origin web access, to enable use of resources in a web application from a site other than the source of the web application. What else can be done?
Taking an overall architectural view is helpful (see “Framework for Web Science”). The 2001 semantic web layering diagram is illuminating in that the capstone is “Trust” and that “Digital Signature” is a glue binding the parts together, showing the fundamental importance of trust based on security mechanisms (the 2006 version is also in the text showing Crypto instead of Digital Signature and other refinements but still requiring security mechanisms and proof to support trust):
I offer another security-centric architectural diagram to suggest the magnitude of the size of the task of “simply providing a security foundation”:
Working through the diagram we see the following items:
Entropy. The basis of most digital security (as opposed to building a physical moat around your castle) is the amount of true randomness or entropy upon which the techniques depend. If the randomness is not there, then the digital techniques fall apart. That makes this the basis, though often ignored.
Key Management. A fundamental security principle is that only the key need be secret, not the algorithms etc. Thus given good entropy, the next building block is suitable keys, keeping private keys secret and so on. A lousy key won’t be of much use.
Next is some means of associating keys with their purpose, discovering and using appropriate keys, and knowing they are valid. I put this as Certificate management (including revocation) and all that goes behind CA certificate issuance. I use PKI terminology but this may not be the only way to accomplish this (in fact the question appears whether X.509 should be replaced, given the ambiguities and complexity)
To be useful the use of crypto algorithms depends on keys and meaningful associations (even though certs may be created using crypto functions as well)
Confidentiality and integrity are fundamental security features, I add identity as an essential building block in this layer (though again obviously certs may support this functionality there may be more to it in terms of policy, access control etc)
Finally we get to the Web Applications that pull it all together (or do they)?
The reason for doubt is on the side: implementation quality for all items matters a great deal, as does the fact that everything must evolve over time (e.g. key and certification roll-over, algorithm agility etc)
I put trust on the other side to indicate that items must operate in an integrated manner to produce a usable result. (I also left out reputation management as another trust mechanism).
As experienced with Internet protocol layering, some functionality is replicated in different layers and we can discuss what the exact layering should be. However, it is clear that there are a large number of logical components, all of which must work correctly depending on correct design, correct implementation, and correct deployment and use. That offers a large number of opportunities for failure.
What is needed are generic high level simplifications to make trust more achievable. Strict Transport Security does that, taking a successfully deployed protocol and reducing the attack surface. CORS works toward that end at well, by slightly increasing an attack surface to enable needed functionality but in a controlled and understood manner.
It seems that we need more work to reduce the attack surface in a consistent manner, by reducing optionality and choices. It seems that one area is certification – are there too many choices and details in creating certificates and managing them? Can we reduce the choices and ambiguities?
It seems a good time to review how much can be simplified, how many options can be removed, and how much consistency can be encouraged. Maybe the W3C TAG could work on this, for example. It seems fundamental to next steps for the Architecture of the World Wide Web.
1. You want bright colors to make a fashion statement, you want a great camera? Then you don’t need Lumia, because we have new colorful iPhone 5c as well as a new iPhone 5s with new camera hardware and software with improved bigger sensor with bigger pixels and a faster f2.2 lens.
Nokia has responded with 5 things Apple did not include that Lumia does. We will probably see more responses.
2. You care about health, well we have new hardware and API in the iPhone 5s that means soon there will be a zillion great health apps. This is a new job to be done that the iPhone can do, conveniently and easily. No need for watch or accessory right now, the phone will do.
3. You want usability, no need to type a password, want to prevent Junior from racking up thousands of iTunes store charges? Use the new iPhone 5s fingerprint reader which works to both unlock the phone and confirm store purchases.
Oh yes, All the info is kept private to the chip, so don’t be afraid to use this.
4. We upped the performance in the iPhone 5s yet again with the A7 and 64 bit, enabling all the new iOS 7 graphics, games and making everything perform.
5. Both will be available in many countries and operators in the next two weeks including China – unlike others, this is something you can find and buy.
6. We didn’t go cheap on either. Nor are either inexpensive unlocked. And no, we didn’t increase the screen size.
Since then the TAG has reviewed architectural issues on what appears to be an ad hoc basis, producing what are known as “TAG Findings“, expert answers to specific questions. I surmise that the visibility and usefulness of these has been less than it could be, probably since W3C working groups are not always either aware of them at all, or not sure which might be applicable to the problems they are working on, or if they’ve seen them, not sure how to apply them to the specific problem they are facing.
The TAG has also devoted much effort on work that has not reached conclusion, given the wide constituency and difficulty of the problems they have worked on. In some cases the work has stopped with “draft findings, in other cases only discussion on the mail list. A lot of good ideas and information may be lost but it is hard to tell.
The W3C is in a sea of change, including movement toward “living documents” as opposed to versioned dated documents. The idea of versioned documents was simple – a group agrees to approve a definitive version as of a date in time, making it a standard. The benefits of this approach are clear – there is a static document that can be referenced, will not change, and for which consensus can be clearly recorded. The issues are also clear: with faster development cycles static documents can become out of date more quickly making it misleading to have a static approved document as the target of links when newer corrected material is available yet not readily found. The solution to this issue is to have continuously updated drafts, so that the latest version is the definitive version, so called “living documents”. The concern here is that the process can spin out of control, with editors adding what they will without checks and balances – “if you don’t spot it, you must approve it”could become the new mantra. We need both – a rapid cycle time as well as clarity of approval and agreement. (The solution in progress appears to be pull requests in git accepted by those we trust).
What does this have to do with the TAG? Well the TAG is part of this sea of change as well, as reflected in the previous TAG election where a common theme was that the TAG need work less on abstractions and closer to the needs of developers and working groups. There is a desire that the TAG produce material relevant to current work on web applications (and other topics) and that this material can be easily found and used.
It seems the time has come for an new volume of the Architecture of the World Wide Web, addressing topics related to Open Web Platform applications, APIs and programming, open data, and security and privacy. I’d argue for a new volume, as I’d rather not see history rewritten (e.g. to expunge XML, despite it’s continued use in various communities). It is usually easier to correct and improve a draft than to create a new one, so the TAG should seed the process of “documenting and creating consensus around principles of Web architecture” by creating a new Architecture of the World Wide Web volume and working with the W3C community to get it right. This continues the original TAG mission yet represents a change from the recent past in how it is done.
I suggest that focusing on addressing high priority issues of the web architectural evolution and interoperability with the focus of producing a specific document can give the TAG focus and enable feedback, organizing “findings” and issue resolution into a specific result that can be readily shared. I can help with this, both with the writing and creation of this new work as well as collaborating with the TAG, in the Working Groups and communities (such as PING and others). What I can do, as a member of the TAG, is to get this started, organized, written down, and communicated so that the work of the TAG is visible and useful to the community and so the community can get involved to make it better.